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On October 6, 2000, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University, hosted a one-day conference entitled: The Death of the “Death Tax”?
The keynote luncheon speaker was Joel Slemrod, Paul W. McCracken Collegiate
Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan
Business School. Panel participants throughout the day included, in alphabetical
order, Ira Bloom, Professor of Law at Albany Law School, Patricia A. Cain,
Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law, Joel C. Dobris, Professor
of Law at the University of California at Davis, Joseph M. Dodge, the W.H. Francis,
Jr., Professor of Law at the University of Texas Law School, Carolyn Jones,
Professor of Law at the University if Connecticut School of Law, James Repetti,
Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, Richard Schmalbeck, Professor of
Law at Duke University School of Law, and James G. Wilson, Professor of Law at
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Several of the participants have agreed to
publish their work in this symposium issue, introduced by Deborah A. Geier,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, who organized and hosted the conference.

THE DEATH OF THE “DEATH TAX”?: AN INTRODUCTION
DEBORAH A. GEIER1
Good morning! My name is Deborah Geier, and I am a member of the faculty
here at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I first want to thank each and every one
of our panelists today for saying “yes” to my entreaties to come to Cleveland and
participate in this one-day conference considering the possible repeal of the estate
tax. I next want to thank each and every one in the audience for coming to share this
day of ideas with us.
In the brief ten minutes that I have reserved to introduce the day, I would like to
consider the question: What brings us together today to consider the possible repeal
of the estate tax? We would not likely be here today if the repeal of the estate tax
were not a serious political possibility, and it would not likely be a serious political
possibility if many middle-class taxpayers earning the median household income of
about $40,000 to $50,000 per year2 did not support outright repeal, rather than muchneeded reform. A June, 2000, Gallup poll, for example, indicated that 60% of those
polled favored elimination of the estate tax, “even though only 17% [believed that]
they ‘would personally benefit.’ (Even that 17% is far higher than reality.)”3 Why
do they support outright repeal today when they would not have done so, say, ten
years ago? As a Wall Street Journal article described, “[a] decade ago, when
business groups first started campaigning against what they call the death tax, ‘we

1

Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.

2

Different sources quote different numbers for the current household median income. See,
e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Colleges Post Average Rise in Tuition of 5 Percent, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2000, at A23 (“In the last decade, the median family income has risen 8 percent, to
$49,012 from $45,552, after adjusting for inflation.”); Steven A. Holmes, Incomes Up and
Poverty is Down, Data Show, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2000, at A12 (“The Census Bureau
reported today that median household income topped $40,000 for the first time last year ….”).
3

See Jacob M. Schlesinger & Nicholas Kulish, As Paper Millionaires Multiply, Estate Tax
Takes a Public Beating, WALL ST. J., July 13, 2000, at A1.
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were laughed out of rooms,’ says Dan Blankenburg, a lobbyist for the National
Federation of Independent Business. The tax applied only to the wealthiest
Americans, and everyone in Washington, Republicans included, told him ‘you’ll
never get that repealed.’”4
In the past, pressure for major legislative change occurred only when the tax
began to reach more than 2% of those who died. The Fall 1999 issue of the IRS
Statistics of Income Bulletin contained a chart with a table compiling the estate tax
returns as a percentage of adult deaths in selected years between 1934 and 1995.5
The number was generally between 1 and 2% for each year until you got to 1958,
when it exceeded 2% for the first time, reaching 2.84%.6 It exceeded 3% in 1960
and 1962, 4% in 1965, 5% in 1969, 6% in 1972, and it reached a high of 7.65% of all
adult deaths in 1976.7 By 1982, it was back down to 1.82%, where it has stayed
relatively constant.8 What happened between 1976 and 1982? The gross estate
filing threshold was only $60,000 in 1976, only $10,000 higher than the $50,000
threshold in effect way back in 1934,9 and the corresponding increase in numbers of
decedents being subjected to the tax provoked political change. By 1982, the
threshold had been raised to $225,000, and today it generally stands at $675,000,
already scheduled to go up to $1 million, $2 million for a married couple, even
without further legislative amendment.10 The point is that widespread pressure for
change occurred in the past only when the tax began to hit significantly more than
2% of all adult deaths. That is not the case today.11 And it would not be the case in
the foreseeable future under the Democrats’ reform alternative of raising the estate
tax threshold to $4 million per couple (more for family farms and small businesses)
and reforming the base and rate structure, which would exempt from liability more
than half of all decedents who would otherwise owe a tax under the current
structure.12
So what changes in taxpayer psychology or the economy or in social attitudes
accounts for support for full repeal so far down the income spectrum? After all, it’s
undeniable that the estate tax is extremely progressive for the very reason that it
4

Id.

5

See 19 SOI BULLETIN, Number 2 (Fall 1999), Table 16, at 285.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id. at 314 n.2.

10

See I.R.C. §§ 6018(a), 2010(c) (1994).

11

In 1997, estate tax was owed by 1.9% of all decedents. See Albert R. Hunt, Reform the
Estate Tax, Don’t Repeal It, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2000, at A25.
12

See generally David Cay Johnston, Despite Benefits, Democrats’ Estate Tax Plan Gets
Little Notice, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2000, at C1; Martin A. Sullivan, Estate Tax Compromise or
Repeal: The Rich Versus the Super Rich, 88 TAX NOTES 298 (2000); Tanner, Blue Dogs
Throw Estate Tax Relief a Lifeline, TAX NOTES TODAY, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library,
TNT file, Sept. 28, 2000, 2000 TNT 189-2 (each briefly describing the Democrat proposal).
The Democrat proposal “would slash by two-thirds the already small number of families
facing such a tax.” Schlesinger & Kulish, supra note 3.
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collects tax from fewer than 2% of all decedents each year. Moreover, many in this
room know that, of the 2% that pays tax, more than half of all revenues are collected
from the top 6%.13 In other words, the truly super rich pays more than half of all
estate tax revenues, with the other 94% of taxable estates paying less than half of all
estate tax revenues, and 98% of people who die owing no tax at all. As a New York
Times editorial put it, “Seldom have so many voted for a gargantuan tax cut for so
few.”14
Several of the stock responses that seek to explain this support by median income
earners might, in fact, be true, such as the possibility that people severely
misunderstand the tax. For example, those who support repeal have claimed again
and again, and thus many people believe, that the dollars taxed under the estate tax
were already taxed once under the income tax. Many in this room know that this is
not entirely true, that much of what is taxed under the estate tax is capital income
that escapes taxation at the individual level under our porous income tax,15 with the
estate tax thus serving as an important backstop to the income tax.16
And they have also repeatedly claimed that many farms and small businesses
have to be sold on death to pay estate taxes.17 While commentators agree that there
must surely be some farm or small business somewhere that was, indeed, sold to pay
estate taxes, no one seems to have ever been able to find it.18 As most people in this

13
In 1998, the top 6% of the approximately 2% of all decedents who owed estate tax paid
$10.39 billion in taxes, while the remaining 94% of taxable estates paid $9.96 billion in taxes.
See Schlesinger & Kulish, supra note 3, at charts (drawn from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of
Consumer Finances, U.S. Treasury, Edward N. Wolff, NYU). “[T]he bulk of each year’s
inheritance tax is actually paid by only a few thousand multimillion-dollar estates. This really
is a tax levied almost entirely on the very, very well off.” Paul Krugman, Death and Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2000, at A31.
14

See Editorial, A Gift to the Wealthiest, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, § 4, at 1; Bob Herbert,
A Handout for the Very Wealthy, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2000, at A17 (quoting the editorial).
15
Much of the wealth taxed under the estate tax consists of appreciation in the value of
property, such as stocks and real estate, that is taxed neither to the decedent nor the heir
(because of the step up in basis at death for the heir under I.R.C. § 1014) under the income tax.
See, e.g., Schlesinger & Kulish, supra note 3 (describing as “not entirely accurate” the notion
that “the estate tax amounts to double taxation—that the government is taking still more from
income it has already skimmed”).
16
See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 12, at 300 (referring to the estate tax as “a backstop to the
leaky, progressive income tax”).
17
Indeed, to make the point regarding family farms once again, Congress delivered to the
White House the estate tax repeal bill passed in the summer of 2000 via a rancher driving a
tractor. See Ryan J. Donmoyer, Clinton Wields Veto Pen on GOP Estate Tax Bill, 88 TAX
NOTES 1184 (2000).
18

As one newspaper article described the phenomenon:
Professor Harl, the Iowa State University estate tax expert, said that he had heard
many horror stories about people having to sell farms to pay estate taxes. But in 35
years of conducting estate tax seminars for farmers, he added, “I have pushed and
pushed and hunted and probed and I have not been able to find a single case where
estate taxes caused the sale of a family farm; it’s a myth.”
Johnston, supra note 12.
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room again likely know, farms and small businesses that are sold on death typically
are sold because the kids have no desire to continue dad’s business, but would rather
have the cash and follow their own dreams to be a doctor or a lawyer instead. Thus,
those businesses would be sold even if the tax were repealed.
While misunderstanding might, in fact, explain the phenomenon to at least some
extent, I would like to suggest that perhaps the support actually signals a more
fundamental change in taxpayer psychology and attitudes toward wealth acquisition.
I would like to suggest that in decades far past, one’s good fortune was taken, in part
at least, as just that—as “good fortune”—in part due to luck or good genes or being
in the right place at the right time in the right country in the right era. Progressive
taxation, including but not limited to the estate tax, was not uncommonly viewed as
an appropriately larger contribution to the public fisc to support the economic and
social environment—a regulated capitalist system—that makes such top-heavy
wealth acquisition possible in the first place. That doesn’t seem to be the case
anymore. It seems to me that Americans more and more feel that whatever wealth
comes under their control is attributable solely to their own hard work and merit, and
even the wealthy are viewed by the nonwealthy as having “earned” their wealth.
One recent Gallup poll, for example, found that 53% believed that the rich are rich
because of “strong effort,” while only 32% credited “luck” or “circumstances beyond
[their] control.”19 And Lawrence Lindsey, Governor George W. Bush’s chief
economic advisor, has said that “the envy argument … carries a lot less weight than
it used to [because Americans] have a sense that those who have money today have
earned it.”20
As an aside, this change in attitude—if indeed it is a change—is occurring when,
for example, nearly 40% of the Forbes 400 in 1999 achieved their wealth the easy
way: they inherited it, with this 40% slice inheriting on average $2.5 billion each.21
Or as the Economist magazine put it in 1998, “In many cases, the rich have got
richer by doing rather little. An American who had $500,000 in shares and a
$500,000 New York apartment fifteen years ago, and has merely held on to them, is
now $5 million better off.”22 Wealth begets wealth, sometimes without much effort,
which has perhaps contributed in part to the increasing wealth concentration in this
country, with the top 1% nearly doubling their share of national wealth between
1976 and 1998.23
19

Schlesinger & Kulish, supra note 3.

20

Id.

21
See Phil Galewitch, There Are 268 American Billionaires …, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Sept.
24, 1999, at 2A.
22

The Challenge for America’s Rich, THE ECONOMIST, May 30, 1998, at 15.

23

As reported recently:
This newfound concern about economic “fairness” to the richest families follows a
quarter-century in which the upper crust has prospered more, relatively speaking, than
the rest of the country. The wealthiest 1% of American families held 38.1% of the
country’s net worth in 1998, the most recent year for which data are available,
according to calculations done by New York University economist Edward Wolff.
The proportion of wealth held by the richest 1% has climbed steadily from a low of
21.8% in 1976.
Schlesinger & Kulish, supra note 3.
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But more to the point, if I am right in my suspicions that attitudes toward the
wealthy and their desert (and I’m not talking about ice cream) are changing, it is
particularly ironic that this should be happening now, at the end of the 1990s and the
beginning of the 21st century, if we are persuaded by the arguments made by Robert
Frank and Philip Cook in their provocative 1995 book that “winner-take-all markets”
are becoming ever more common.24
As described by Frank and Cook, a winner-take-all market has several
characteristics. It is one in which relative merit, as opposed to only absolute merit,
determines who wins, where differences in absolute merit might actually be quite
small.25 Think of the difference between the gold medal winner at the Olympics and
the silver medalist. Only hundredths of a second might separate them, but the
financial rewards that go to the gold medalist in endorsements, etc., are huge, while
no one remembers the silver medalist only days later.26
The miler who triumphs in the Olympic Games, who places himself
momentarily at the top of the pyramid of all milers, leads a thousand nextbest competitors by mere seconds. The gap between best and second-best,
or even best and tenth-best, is so slight that a gust of wind or a different
running shoe might have accounted for the margin of victory.27
Moreover, increasingly competitive market conditions due to many factors,
including increasing technology and the breakdown of loyalty within organizations,28
bids up the price of that relatively small group of winners to heights not commonly
seen prior to the 1980s in spheres outside sports and entertainment.29 Today, the
authors argue that winner-take-all markets “have permeated law, journalism,
consulting, medicine, investment banking, corporate management, publishing,
design, fashion, and even the hallowed halls of academe.”30 Whereas the median
income in an increasing number of professions has remained relatively constant, the
distributions around that median have become far more pronounced, with the
winners at the top gaining a significantly higher share.31 The realm of pay reaped by

24

ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995).

25

“Reward by relative performance is the single most important distinguishing
characteristic of winner-take-all markets.” Id. at 24; see generally id. at 23-25.
26

“A second feature of winner-take-all markets is that rewards tend to be concentrated in
the hands of a few top performers, with small differences in talent or effort often giving rise to
enormous differences in incomes.” Id. at 24.
27

Id. at 17 (quoting JAMES GLEICK, GENIUS 128 (1992)).

28

See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 4584 (describing a host of factors that have contributed to the recent growth of winner-take-all
markets).
29

“In effect, the reward structure common in entertainment and sports—where thousands
compete for a handful of big prizes at the top—has now permeated many other sectors of the
economy.” Id. at viii.
30

Id. at 3-4.

31

See id. at 61-84.
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CEOs is one much-discussed example. “Today’s average chief executive earns 475
times as much as the average factory worker, up from a ratio of forty-two in 1980.”32
While some positive economic effects no doubt arise from winner-take-all
markets,33 Frank and Cook also describe many negative effects. One is that such
markets attract too many contestants, to the detriment of overall economic efficiency
(i.e., aggregate societal wealth). Seeing the huge payoffs that are reaped by winners
like Michael Jordan, for example, may cause too many inner-city youths to spend
more time on the playground shooting hoops in unrealistic hopes of making the NBA
than in the classroom, where they might learn the skills to earn a perfectly satisfying
living as an accountant. As a result, they (and society) lose out on their earnings as
an accountant.34
Another is that, because small differences in relative merit can result in huge
differences in the payoff, winner-take-all markets encourage the equivalent of
unproductive positional arms races, i.e., wasteful investments that are incurred by the
contestants in an attempt to get that relative edge over the other contestants. Think
of the taking of anabolic steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs by
Olympic athletes. None would do that if they could be sure that the others would not
as well, but if they cannot be sure that the others will not, they are induced to engage
in this behavior as well, for no net benefit to either the contestant pool at large or
society.35 The authors trace the same response in such areas as competition to be
admitted into the elite universities.36
And, finally, the authors note that “[w]inner-take-all markets have increased the
disparity between rich and poor.”37
So a reduction of the huge payoff that goes to the small group of winners could
help to ameliorate these negative effects, which leads the authors to assert that the
age-old tradeoff in tax values between fairness and economic efficiency might not
hold true in winner-take-all markets. It may no longer be true, they assert, that
progressive taxation decreases economic efficiency. It might actually increase
economic efficiency38 and decrease the negative consequences, such as the wasteful
investment in enhancement behavior, that typify a winner-take-all market39 by
32

Labour Pains, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2000, at The New Economy Survey 25.

33

See FRANK & COOK, supra note 24, at 4.

34

See id. at 7-9, 101-21.

35

See id. at 9-11, 125-46.

36

See id. at 147-66.

37

See id. at 4; see also FRANK & COOK, supra note 24, at 5-7.

38

“To the extent that most of society’s top earners are participants in winner-take-all
markets, it follows that a more progressive tax structure would not reduce but actually increase
economic efficiency!” Id. at 21. “In economies in which winner-take-all effects are
important, output not only need not fall with increases in tax rates on high incomes, but it may
very well rise sharply.” Id. at 123. While only anecdotal evidence, it is interesting to note that
the significant marginal income tax rate increases on the wealthy enacted in 1990 (the 31%
bracket) and 1993 (the 36% and 39.6% brackets) preceded the biggest increase in productivity
that this nation has seen in some time. Now, of course, our increased productivity is due no
doubt to a host of factors that are perhaps only dimly understood today, but nevertheless. . . .
39

Id. at 121-23, 212-17.
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forcing the winners in such markets to shoulder more of the costs of the negative
externalities that can arise in such markets.40 Moreover, they also note:
Winner-take-all markets have implications not only for efficiency but also
for norms of fairness. The economist’s theory of wages, which holds that
workers are paid in proportion to the value of their productive
contributions, was never intended to justify market income distributions
on ethical grounds. Nonetheless, many see a certain rough justice when
pay is distributed on that basis, for the system rewards not only talent but
also the willingness to expend the effort. In winner-take-all markets,
however, pay distributions will be more spread out—often dramatically
so—than the underlying distributions of effort and ability. It is one thing
to say that people who work 10 percent harder or have 10 percent more
talent should receive 10 percent more pay. But it is quite another to say
that such small differences should cause pay to differ by 10,000 percent or
more…. The realization of how winner-take-all markets contribute to
income inequality may affect the extent to which society tries to alter
market distributions in the name of fairness.41
Now, I do want to make clear that the authors nowhere mention the estate tax,
and I therefore do not want to impute to them any stated support for the estate tax. In
fact, I have a sneaking suspicion that they would, in fact, not support it.42 But my
modest point is that I think that their work at the least suggests the irony that at a
time when winner-take-all markets seem to be gaining increasing prominence and
depth in our economy, where at least a portion of the winners’ rewards is due more
to current market mechanisms than their own ability and worth (particularly for the
top winners, who are the most likely to be subject to the estate tax), an increasing
segment of the population actually believes just the opposite—or we wouldn’t all be
here today discussing the very real possibility of full repeal of wealth transfer taxes.
With those introductory thoughts, let me introduce our first panelist….

40

Id. at 20.

41

FRANK & COOK, supra note 24, at 17.

42

The authors support progressive consumption taxation, in contrast to progressive income
taxation. See id. at 213-17. Other commentators who support progressive consumption
taxation do not support the estate tax, seeing in both a fatal flaw in the disincentive to save,
whether or not that disincentive actually affects savings behavior. See, e.g., Edward J.
McCaffery, The Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAPMAN L. REV. 233 (1999) (citing and
discussing his prior work that has consistently argued for a progressive-consumption-withoutestate-tax regime).
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